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What	Makes	a	Social	Order	Primitive?		In	Defense	of	Hart’s	Take	On	
International	Law‡*	
David	Lefkowitz,	University	of	Richmond	
H.L.A.	Hart’s	discussion	of	international	law	in	Chapter	X	of	The	Concept	of	
Law	has	earned	him	few	friends.		In	one	respect	this	is	surprising;	after	all,	Hart	
devotes	a	considerable	portion	of	the	chapter	to	rebutting	his	fellow	Legal	Positivist	
John	Austin’s	claim	that	international	law	is	not	law	properly	so-called,	but	(only)	
positive	morality.		Why,	then,	do	so	many	remain	unhappy	with	Hart’s	treatment	of	
international	law?		In	a	word,	because	he	characterizes	it	as	primitive.		More	
precisely,	Hart	maintains	that	international	law	resembles	the	simple	legal	order	
that	regulates	a	primitive	society,	one	that	“we	are	accustomed	to	contrast	with	a	
developed	legal	system,”	and	especially,	in	The	Concept	of	Law,	with	the	municipal	
legal	system	of	a	well-functioning	state.1		For	some,	the	mere	use	of	the	word	
‘primitive’	to	describe	international	law	casts	a	good	deal	of	suspicion	not	only	on	
																																																								
‡	Published	in	Legal	Theory	23:4	(2017):	258-82.	
*	I	wish	to	thank	Nicole	Roughan	for	inviting	me	to	present	an	earlier	version	of	this	paper	at	the	
National	University	of	Singapore	Law	School,	and	for	her	comments	on	it,	as	well	as	those	offered	by	
David	Frydrych,	Mark	McBride,	Terry	Nardin,	James	Penner,	Patrick	Taylor	Smith,	and	a	referee	for	
this	journal.		Any	remaining	errors	are	my	own.		Portions	of	this	paper	were	completed	while	I	
served	as	an	Isaac	Manasseh	Meyer	Visiting	Research	Fellow	at	the	National	University	of	Singapore,	
and	as	the	Class	of	1958	Rorer	Ethical	Leadership	Visiting	Fellow	at	the	United	States	Naval	
Academy’s	Stockdale	Center	for	Ethical	Leadership.		The	views	expressed	herein	are	strictly	my	own.	
1	H.L.A.	H	HART,	THE	CONCEPT	OF	LAW,	3RD	EDITION	(2012),	at	214.	
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Hart’s	discussion	of	it	but	also	on	his	entire	analysis	of	law.2		For	others,	the	problem	
lies	with	the	fact	that	this	very	analysis	provides	no	warrant	for	the	conclusion	that	
international	law	is	akin	to	a	primitive	social	order;	that	is,	for	Hart’s	assertion	“that	
international	law	not	only	lacks	the	secondary	rules	of	change	and	adjudication	
which	provide	for	legislature	and	courts,	but	also	a	unifying	rule	of	recognition	
specifying	‘sources’	of	law	and	providing	general	criteria	for	the	identification	of	its	
rules.”3		Hart’s	arguments	in	Chapter	X,	writes	Jeremy	Waldron,	“become	careless	
and	their	application	thoughtless	in	regard	to	law	in	this	area,”	and	the	result	is	an	
embarrassingly	inadequate	account	of	the	nature	and	status	of	international	law.4	
																																																								
2	See,	e.g.,	Ian	Brownlie,	THE	RULE	OF	LAW	IN	INTERNATIOAL	AFFAIRS:	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	AT	
THE	FIFTIETH	ANNIVERSARY	OF	THE	UNITED	NATIONS	(1998),	at	3-6;	Jason	A.	Beckett,	The	
Hartian	Tradition	in	International	Law,	1	THE	JOURNAL	JURISPRUDENCE	51-83	(2008)	at	56;	Patrick	
Capps,	International	Legal	Positivism	and	Modern	Natural	Law,	in	INTERNATIONAL	LEGAL	
POSITIVISM	IN	A	POST-MODERN	WORLD	(J.	Kammerhofer	and	J.	D’Aspremont	eds.,	2014)	at	215;	
and	Anthony	A.	D’Amato,	The	Neo-Positivist	Concept	of	International	Law,	59	AMERICAN	JOURNAL	OF	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	321-324	(1965)	at	322-23,	though	D’Amato	later	adopted	facets	of	Hart’s	
analysis	of	law.		Socio-legal	jurisprudents	sometimes	respond	this	way	as	well;	see,	e.g.,	Roger	
Cotterrell,	What	is	Transnational	Law?	37	LAW	AND	SOCIAL	INQUIRY	500-524	(2012)	at	507;	and	
Brian	Tamanaha,	What	is	Law?	WASHINGTON	UNIVERSITY	IN	ST	LOUIS	LEGAL	STUDIES	RESEARCH	
PAPER	No.	15-01-01(2015),	accessed	from	SSRN	on	June	6,	2016,	at	54.	
3	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	214.	
4	Jeremey	Waldron,	International	Law:	‘A	Relatively	Small	and	Unimportant’	Part	of	Jurisprudence?	In	
READING	HLA	HART’S	THE	CONCEPT	OF	LAW	(L.	Duarte	d’Alemida,	J.	Edwards,	and	A.	Dolcetti	eds.,	
2013)	at	213	and	211.		See	also	Waldron’s	description	of	Hart’s	reflections	on	international	law	as	
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Mehrdad	Payandeh	also	claims	to	identify	multiple	shortcomings	in	Hart’s	
application	of	his	own	ideas	to	international	law,	and	suggests	that	his	“insistence	
that	international	law	does	not	constitute	a	legal	system	seems	almost	as	
problematic	as	Austin’s	insistence	that	international	law	is	not	law	at	all.”5		Even	
Jean	D’Aspremont,	who	draws	a	great	deal	from	Hart’s	analysis	of	law	in	developing	
his	own	formalist	theory	of	international	law’s	sources,	describes	Hart’s	discussion	
in	chapter	X	as	a	“disappointing	and	unconvincing	portrayal	of	international	law	as	a	
very	primitive	set	of	rules.”6		At	best,	then,	Hart’s	allegedly	careless	ruminations	on	
international	law	constitute	a	missed	opportunity	to	improve	the	quality	of	his	own	
jurisprudential	theorizing,	as	well	as	that	of	his	students	and	readers.		At	worst,	
despite	his	intentions	Hart	bears	some	blame	for	the	persistence	of	skepticism	vis-à-
vis	international	law’s	genuine	status	as	law,	and	the	relatively	small	number	of	
analytical	legal	theorists	engaged	with	this	“issue	of	the	hour.”7	
																																																								
“unhelpful,”	“careless,”	and	“indifferent”	in	Jeremy	Waldron,	Hart	and	the	Principles	of	Legality,	in	
THE	LEGACY	OF	H.L.A.	HART	(M.H.	Kramer	et	al.	eds.,	2008)	at	68-9.	
5	Mehrdad	Payandeh,	The	Concept	of	International	Law	in	the	Jurisprudence	of	H.L.A.	Hart,	21	
EUROPEAN	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	967,	at	978	(2011).	
6	JEAN	D’ASPREMONT,	FORMALISM	AND	THE	SOURCES	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW:	A	THEORY	OF	
THE	ASCERTAINMENT	OF	LEGAL	RULES	(2011),	at	56.		For	another	example	of	an	international	legal	
theorist	who	put	Hart’s	analysis	of	law	to	work	despite	expressing	deep	dissatisfaction	with	Hart’s	
discussion	of	international	law,	see	G.J.H.	VAN	HOOF,	RETHINKING	THE	SOURCES	OF	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	(1983).	
7	Waldron,	supra	note	4,	at	69.	
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	 In	this	essay	I	argue	that	antipathy	to	Hart’s	treatment	of	international	law	
rests	on	two	misunderstandings.		The	first	concerns	the	nature	of	the	distinction,	or	
rather	distinctions,	that	Hart	draws	between	a	primitive	and	an	advanced	society.	
Not	only	in	Chapter	X	but	throughout	The	Concept	of	Law	Hart	fails	to	clearly	and	
consistently	separate	two	bases	for	differentiating	a	simple	or	primitive	social	order	
from	a	complex	or	advanced	one.		One	is	the	absence	or	presence	of	secondary	rules	
tout	court.		The	other	is	the	absence	or	presence	of	a	division	of	labor	in	identifying,	
altering,	applying	and	enforcing	the	general	social	rules	that	govern	and	partly	
constitute	a	given	society.		This	specialization	in	the	performance	of	governance	
tasks	is	realized	in	the	practice	of	a	specific	class	of	secondary	rules,	namely	those	
that	create	or	constitute	legislative,	judicial,	and	executive	offices	and	institutions.8		
Waldron,	Payandeh	and	others	assume	that	Hart	has	the	first	of	the	two	
aforementioned	distinctions	in	mind	when	he	characterizes	international	law	as	
primitive,	and	critique	it	on	that	basis.		I	contend,	however,	that	when	Hart	
describes	international	law	as	akin	to	a	simple	social	order	he	employs	the	second	
basis	for	distinguishing	a	primitive	from	an	advanced	society.		Read	in	this	light,	
																																																								
8	My	use	of	the	phrase	‘governance	tasks’	is	inspired	by	Lewis	A.	Kornhauser,	Governance	Structures,	
Legal	Systems,	and	The	Concept	of	Law,	79	CHICAGO-KENT	LAW	REVIEW	355.		Like	Kornhauser,	my	
reading	of	The	Concept	of	Law	pushes	it	in	a	social	scientific	direction,	albeit	without	reducing	the	
study	of	the	question	“what	is	law?”	to	a	mere	description	of	common	features	characteristic	of	
putative	legal	orders	that	Hart	seems	to	have	thought	exhaustively	characterized	the	sociology	of	
law.		
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many	of	Hart’s	claims	in	chapter	X	were	compelling	when	he	wrote	The	Concept	of	
Law,	and	to	a	not	insignificant	degree	remain	so	today.9				
	 The	second	confusion	that	afflicts	critics	of	Hart’s	remarks	on	international	
law	follows	from	a	failure	to	distinguish	carefully	between	two	different	functions	
that	reference	to	the	rule	of	recognition	serves	in	Hart’s	analysis	of	law.		One	is	
epistemic;	the	(or	a)	rule	of	recognition	is	a	norm	that	actors	can	use	to	identify	the	
law	of	a	particular	society.		The	other	is	ontological;	here	‘rule	of	recognition’	refers	
not	to	a	norm	but	to	the	practice	of	holding	accountable	that	makes	it	the	case	that	
rules	R1,	R2,	etc.,	are	rules	of	a	particular	society.		Whereas	Hart’s	critics	rely	on	the	
epistemic	role	played	by	a	rule	of	recognition,	and	so	reject	his	claims	that	
international	law	lacks	a	rule	of	recognition	and	is	not	a	legal	system,	I	argue	instead	
that	these	claims	should	be	interpreted	ontologically.		A	legal	system	in	the	sense	
that	concerns	Hart	in	chapter	X	requires	a	hierarchy	of	agents,	a	feature	
international	law	largely	does	without.		That	is	why	he	maintains	we	can	form	no	
ontological	“rule”	of	recognition	for	international	law,	or	at	least	not	an	informative	
“rule,”	since	there	is	nothing	much	to	say	about	what	makes	L1,	L2,	etc.,	
																																																								
9	Few	believe	that	either	the	idea	of	social	rules	or	of	specialization	in	the	performance	of	governance	
tasks,	or	their	combination,	suffice	to	distinguish	law	from	other	kinds	of	social	orders.		One	or	two	
passing	remarks	aside,	I	leave	the	question	of	what	does	so	aside	in	this	paper	and	use	the	terms	‘law’	
and	(social)	‘rule’	interchangeably.	
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international	law	other	than	that	states	use	them	to	hold	themselves	and	each	other	
accountable.10								
	 In	the	next	section	I	offer	a	careful	reading	of	passages	from	chapters	V	and	
VI	in	The	Concept	of	Law	that	support	the	following	two	conclusions.		First,	the	
absence	of	a	division	of	labor	in	the	performance	of	governance	tasks	–	i.e.	
identifying,	altering,	applying,	and	enforcing	law	–	is	equally,	if	not	more,	central	to	
Hart’s	understanding	of	what	makes	a	society	primitive	than	is	the	absence	of	any	
secondary	rules	at	all.		Second,	and	relatedly,	it	is	primarily	in	terms	of	the	presence	
of	such	a	division	of	labor	and	the	implications	it	has	for	the	ontology	of	law	that	
Hart	understands	the	idea	of	a	legal	system,	and	the	ideas	of	a	rule	of	recognition	
and	legal	validity	that	accompany	it.		These	conclusions	provide	the	basis	for	the	
interpretation	of	Hart’s	remarks	on	international	law	that	I	offer	in	section	II,	one	I	
explicate	by	way	of	contrasting	it	with	Waldron’s	and	Payandeh’s	mistaken	reading	
of	chapter	X.		In	the	third	and	final	section	I	offer	rebuttals	to	several	other	
criticisms	of	Hart	premised	on	a	misunderstanding	of	his	characterization	of	
																																																								
10	No	doubt	many	international	lawyers	will	immediately	object	and	point	to	international	courts,	
dispute	resolution	panels,	semi-autonomous	administrative	rule	making	bodies	created	by	treaties,	
etc.		There	is	some	truth	in	these	observations,	though	as	Hart	emphasized	in	chapter	X,	we	should	be	
careful	not	to	exaggerate	it.		In	any	case,	conceding	the	development	that	international	law	has	
undergone	since	Hart	wrote	The	Concept	of	Law	does	not	undermine	the	superiority	of	the	
interpretation	of	his	argument	I	offer	to	that	offered	by	his	critics.		Nor,	more	importantly,	does	it	
detract	from	the	theoretical	and	moral	advantages	we	stand	to	gain	if	we	take	Hart’s	remarks	on	
international	law	to	heart.	
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international	law.		Furthermore,	I	suggest	some	of	the	ways	in	which	embracing	that	
characterization	might	enhance	both	our	theoretical	understanding	of	how	
international	law	contributes	to	the	production	of	social	order	as	well	as	the	quality	
of	our	reflection	on	international	law	as	a	means	for	advancing	or	realizing	justice.		
I	
From	the	very	outset	Hart	fails	to	clearly	and	consistently	distinguish	
between	the	absence	of	secondary	rules	and	the	absence	of	specialization	in	the	
performance	of	governance	tasks	as	a	basis	for	characterizing	a	social	order	as	
primitive.		He	begins	his	exposition	of	the	idea	of	a	primitive	society	with	the	
following	claim:		
It	is,	of	course,	possible	to	imagine	a	society	without	a	legislature,	
courts,	or	officials	of	any	kind.		Indeed,	there	are	many	studies	of	
primitive	communities	which	not	only	claim	that	this	possibility	is	
realized	but	depict	in	detail	the	life	of	a	society	where	the	only	means	
of	social	control	is	that	general	attitude	of	the	group	towards	its	own	
standard	modes	of	behaviour	in	terms	of	which	we	characterized	
rules	of	obligation.11		
Here	Hart	does	not	maintain	that	primitive	communities	are	ones	characterized	
only	by	the	existence	of	duty-conferring	rules.		Rather,	he	claims	only	that	in	such	a	
society	social	rules	exist	and	contribute	to	the	production	of	social	order	in	virtue	of	
the	group	members	in	general	taking	the	internal	point	of	view	to	those	rules;	that	
																																																								
11	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	91.	
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is,	their	“use	[of]	the	rules	as	standards	for	the	appraisal	of	their	own	and	others’	
behavior.”12		In	order	to	avoid	certain	confusions	he	fears	will	follow	from	labeling	
as	‘customary’	a	social	order	that	lacks	any	specialization	in	the	performance	of	
governance	tasks,	Hart	proposes	in	the	next	sentence	to	refer	“to	such	a	social	
structure	as	one	of	primary	rules	of	obligation.”13		Alas,	in	doing	so	he	appears	to	
shift	from	distinguishing	between	a	primitive	and	an	advanced	society	on	the	basis	
of	the	absence	or	presence	of	specialization	in	governance,	or	what	I	will	call	the	
specialization	distinction,	to	distinguishing	between	the	two	types	of	societies	on	
the	basis	of	the	absence	or	presence	of	secondary	rules	tout	court,	or	what	I	will	call	
the	functional	distinction.14	
	 The	ensuing	discussion	of	the	defects	of	uncertainty,	rigidity,	and	inefficiency	
that	characterize	a	primitive	society,	and	the	contribution	that	rules	of	recognition,	
																																																								
12	Id.,	at	98.	
13	Id.,	at	91.	
14	Hart	then	immediately	lays	the	ground	for	further	possible	confusion	by	briefly	noting	the	content	
of	the	rules	that	must	regulate	even	a	primitive	society,	such	as	“some	form	[of]	restrictions	on	the	
free	use	of	violence,	theft,	and	deception”	(Id.,	at	91).		Given	this	characterization	of	a	primitive	
community,	a	society	will	qualify	as	advanced	if	the	content	of	its	norms	regulate	and	make	possible	
many	forms	of	conduct	beyond	those	that	make	up	what	Hart	later	refers	to	as	the	minimum	content	
of	natural	law.		One	perhaps	too	charitable	interpretation	of	Hart’s	repeated	insistence	in	Chapter	X	
that	municipal	and	international	law	are	characterized	by	many	analogies	of	content	would	be	to	
read	him	as	insisting	that	in	this	vitally	important	respect	international	law	resembles	more	closely	
an	advanced	legal	system	like	that	of	a	well-functioning	modern	state	than	it	does	the	social	order	of	
a	primitive	society.	
	 9	
change,	and	adjudication	make	to	ameliorating	these	defects,	further	muddies	the	
fact	that	there	are	two	ways	to	distinguish	primitive	from	advanced	societies	at	
issue.		The	functional	distinction	figures	most	clearly	in	Hart’s	description	of	a	
primitive	society	suffering	from	the	rigid	or	static	character	of	its	rules.		“There	will	
be	no	means,	in	such	a	[primitive]	society,	of	deliberately	adapting	the	rules	to	
changing	circumstances,	either	by	eliminating	old	rules	or	introducing	new	ones:	for	
again,	the	possibility	of	doing	this	presupposes	the	existence	of	rules	of	a	different	
type	from	the	primary	rules	of	obligation	by	which	alone	the	society	lives.”15		The	
implication	seems	clear:	if	a	society	possesses	rules	of	change	then	it	is	not	a	
primitive	society,	a	point	Hart’s	critics	press	against	him	when	they	point	to	the	
existence	of	such	rules	in	international	law	as	a	reason	to	reject	his	description	of	it	
as	primitive.		Read	in	context,	however,	even	this	passage	offers	some	reason	to	
think	that	Hart	had	both	the	functional	and	the	specialization	distinction	in	mind.		
He	continues:		
In	an	extreme	case	the	rules	may	be	static	in	a	more	drastic	sense.		
This,	though	never	perhaps	fully	realized	in	any	actual	community,	is	
worth	considering	because	the	remedy	for	it	is	something	very	
characteristic	of	law.		In	this	extreme	case,	not	only	would	there	be	no	
way	of	deliberately	changing	the	general	rules,	but	the	obligations	
																																																								
15	Id.,	at	92-3.	
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which	arise	under	the	rules	in	particular	cases	could	not	be	varied	or	
modified	by	the	deliberate	choice	of	any	individual.”16			
The	acknowledgment	that	this	extreme	case	has	likely	never	been	realized	in	any	
actual	community,	together	with	Hart’s	earlier	reference	to	studies	of	actual	
primitive	communities,	suggest	a	recognition	that	communities	without	
specialization	in	modifying	the	law,	i.e.	a	legislature	or	courts,	nevertheless	can	and	
do	possess	rules	of	change;	e.g.	rules	that	empower	members	“to	release	those	
bound	from	performance	or	to	transfer	to	others	the	benefits	which	would	accrue	
from	performance.”17		The	contrast	Hart	draws	between	“changing	the	general	
rules”	and	changing	“the	obligations	which	arise	under	the	rules	in	particular	cases”	
also	implies	that	the	absence	of	a	legislature	or	courts	marks	one	way	to	distinguish	
a	primitive	society	from	an	advanced	one,	with	the	absence	of	any	rules	of	change	at	
all	providing	a	separate	way	of	drawing	such	a	distinction.		Granted,	in	one	sense	the	
creation	of	a	legislative	body	need	not	involve	marking	out	a	special	set	of	agents	
who	make	or	modify	the	rules;	the	legislators	may	consist	of	all	a	community’s	
members.		Nevertheless,	it	introduces	such	specialization	“in	embryonic	form”	by	
introducing	the	categories	of	official	and	subject	that	Hart	maintains	are	absent	
from	a	primitive	community.		Moreover,	the	deliberate	change	of	general	rules	that	
constitutes	legislation	differs	from	the	process	of	customary	rule	change	in	two	
related	respects.		First,	the	actors	whose	practice	of	holding	accountable	produces	a	
																																																								
16	Id.,	at	93.	
17	Id.,	at	93.	
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change	to	a	society’s	customary	norm	do	not	understand	their	actions	as	the	
deliberate	creation	of	a	new	norm,	but	rather	as	making	explicit	a	normative	
standard	to	which	the	community	is	(or	has	already	become)	committed.		Second,	
the	customary	rule-making	process	is	successful	only	when	the	new	rule	is	generally	
practiced	within	the	community,	whereas	the	legislative	law-making	process	makes	
possible	successful	rule	change	in	advance	of	members	of	the	society	in	question	
using	the	rules	to	hold	one	another	accountable.18		I	return	to	all	of	these	points	
below.	
	 Hart’s	discussion	of	inefficiency	focuses	entirely	on	the	shortcomings	
endemic	to	any	society	that	does	not	employ	a	division	of	labor	in	carrying	out	the	
tasks	of	adjudication	and	enforcement.		With	respect	to	adjudication,	Hart	writes:	
“disputes	as	to	whether	an	admitted	rule	has	or	has	not	been	violated	will	always	
occur	and	will,	in	any	but	the	smallest	societies,	continue	interminably,	if	there	is	no	
agency	specially	empowered	to	ascertain	finally	and	authoritatively,	the	fact	of	
violations.”19		As	for	enforcement,	Hart	describes	as	a	weakness	of	a	“simple	form	of	
life”	the	fact	that	“punishments	for	violations	of	the	rules,	and	other	forms	of	social	
pressure	involving	physical	effort	or	the	use	of	force,	are	not	administered	by	a	
																																																								
18	See	Gerald	Postema,	Custom,	Normative	Practice,	and	the	Law,	62	Duke	Law	Journal	707-738	
(2012);	David	Lefkowitz,	Sources	in	Legal	Positivist	Theories:	Law	as	Necessarily	Posited	and	the	
Challenge	of	Customary	Law	Formation,	in	THE	OXFORD	HANDBOOK	OF	THE	SOURCES	OF	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	(Jean	D’Aspremont	and	Samantha	Besson	eds.,	2017)	323-341.	
19	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	93,	italics	added.	
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special	agency	but	are	left	to	the	individuals	affected	or	the	the	group	at	large.”20		
These	defects	in	the	capacity	of	rules	to	contribute	to	the	production	of	social	order	
can	be	mitigated	by	the	adoption	of	rules	that	create	specialized	offices	(e.g.	judges)	
who	enjoy	sole	authority	to	ascertain	whether	a	violation	of	the	rules	has	occurred,	
and	“the	exclusive	power	to	direct	the	application	of	penalties	by	other	officials.”21		
While	Hart	focuses	on	the	characterization	of	these	rules	as	secondary	rules,	the	
above	description	of	the	defects	they	address	and	the	kind	of	solutions	to	them	Hart	
identifies	clearly	implies	that	in	these	passages	he	conceives	of	specialization	in	the	
tasks	of	adjudication	and	enforcement	as	the	property	that	distinguishes	an	
advanced	society	from	a	simple	or	primitive	one.		
	 Hart’s	discussion	of	the	role(s)	played	by	the	rule	of	recognition	is	perhaps	
the	most	vexing	feature	of	The	Concept	of	Law.		Nevertheless,	a	compelling	case	can	
be	made	that	the	specialization	distinction,	far	more	than	the	functional	distinction,	
informs	Hart’s	claim	that	“possession”	of	a	rule	of	recognition	distinguishes	a	
primitive	from	an	advanced	society.		Hart	identifies	as	the	first	defect	of	a	primitive	
social	order	the	fact	that	when	“doubts	arise	as	to	what	the	rules	are	or	as	to	the	
precise	scope	of	some	given	rule,	there	will	be	no	procedure	for	settling	this	doubt,	
either	by	reference	to	an	authoritative	text	or	to	an	official	whose	declarations	on	
this	point	are	authoritative.”22		Reference	to	the	existence	of	an	official	obviously	
implies	a	division	of	labor	between	rulers	and	ruled.		But	so	too	does	reference	to	an	
																																																								
20	Id.,	italics	added.	
21	Id.,	at	98.	
22	Id.,	at	92.	
	 13	
authoritative	text,	since	such	a	text	must	have	an	author,	someone	or	some	group	
whose	judgment	regarding	the	rules	and	their	scope	is	taken	as	authoritative	by	
other	members	of	the	community.		Hart	says	as	much	when	he	writes	that	the	
crucial	first	step	from	the	pre-legal	to	the	legal	–	or	perhaps	he	ought	to	have	said,	
from	a	primitive	rule-guided	social	order	to	an	advanced	one	–	is	not	“the	mere	
reduction	to	writing	of	hitherto	unwritten	rules”	but	“the	acknowledgement	of	
reference	to	the	writing	or	inscription	as	authoritative,	i.e.	as	the	proper	way	of	
disposing	of	doubts	as	to	the	existence	of	the	rule.”23		Why	a	first	but,	by	implication,	
not	a	final	step	from	pre-legal	to	legal?		What	does	Hart	mean	when	he	describes	
even	the	simplest	rule	of	recognition,	such	as	reference	to	a	list	or	text	viewed	as	
authoritative,	as	providing	“in	embryonic	form	the	idea	of	a	legal	system?”24		Why	is	
it	that:	“in	the	simple	operation	of	identifying	a	given	rule	as	possessing	the	required	
feature	of	being	an	item	on	an	authoritative	list	of	rules	we	have	the	germ	of	the	idea	
of	legal	validity?”25		The	answer	to	these	questions,	I	submit,	is	that	we	have	
introduced	the	possibility	not	only	of	specialization	in	the	identification	of	law,	but	a	
division	of	labor	in	the	task	of	sustaining	the	rules	that	constitute	it.		That	task	is	
performed	by	the	practice	of	holding	accountable	that	Hart	characterizes	in	terms	of	
adopting	the	internal	point	of	view	to	the	social	rules	that	regulate	the	affairs	of	
members	of	a	given	society.		It	is	the	presence	of	this	division	of	labor,	at	least	to	
																																																								
23	Id.,	at	95	
24	Id.,	italics	added.	
25	Id.,	italics	added.	
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some	significant	degree,	that	makes	a	society	advanced	in	the	sense	that	concerns	
Hart,	and	so	its	absence	that	makes	a	society	primitive.				
	 The	foregoing	discussion	reveals	an	ambiguity	in	Hart’s	discussion	of	the	idea	
of	a	“legal	system.”		In	some	passages	Hart	contrasts	a	legal	system	with	a	mere	set	
of	laws	or	primary	rules	of	obligation.		The	former	differs	from	the	latter	in	virtue	of	
its	including	a	rule	of	recognition	that	addresses	doubts	over	the	scope	of	various	
rules	by	arranging	them	in	an	order	of	superiority;	for	example,	on	the	basis	of	their	
source.26		In	this	case	the	(or	a)	rule	of	recognition	refers	to	a	genuine	rule,	one	that	
actors	can	use	to	guide	their	conduct.		Specifically,	the	rule	presents	itself	as,	and	
may	well	be,	epistemically	authoritative,	a	description	of	the	practice	of	holding	
accountable	that	constitutes	the	normative	social	order	in	question	that	both	
members	and	non-members	can	use	to	describe	and	predict	the	conduct	of	
practitioners.27		Even	a	society	that	lacks	any	specialization	in	the	performance	of	
																																																								
26	Id.	
27	The	rule	can	be	deployed	by	participants	in	the	practice	to	criticize	others	or	to	defend	themselves	
against	others’	criticisms.		Properly	understood,	however,	such	arguments	can	only	insist	that	the	
other	has	failed	to	accurately	comprehend	some	element	of	the	practice.		This	is	so	because	it	is	the	
actual	practice	of	holding	accountable,	not	any	description	of	it,	that	makes	it	the	case	that	agents	
enjoy	particular	rights,	duties,	powers,	and	immunities,	the	scope	of	which	are	more	or	(sometimes	a	
lot)	less	determinate.		See	Postema,supra	note	18,	at	728;	Lefkowitz,	supra	note	18,	at	333-4.	
Of	course,	insofar	as	those	whose	practice	of	holding	accountable	constitutes	the	existence	of	a	
specific	rule-guided	social	order	use	(purportedly)	authoritative	epistemic	rules	of	recognition	to	
understand	the	practice	in	which	they	engage,	such	rules	can	influence	the	form	the	practice	takes.		
Written	texts	in	particular,	such	as	a	constitutional	document	or	hornbooks	used	in	legal	education,	
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governance	tasks	can	have	a	rule	(or	more	than	one	rule)	of	recognition	that	serves	
this	aim;	e.g.	one	that	depicts	norms	restricting	violence	against	people	as	having	
action-guiding	priority	over	norms	that	restrict	violence	against	property.			
Other	passages	in	which	Hart	invokes	the	concept	of	a	legal	system,	however,	
are	better	read	as	claims	regarding	the	absence	or	presence	of	a	division	of	labor	in	
the	task	of	sustaining	the	law	by	adopting	the	internal	point	of	view	to	the	rules	that	
constitute	it.		Hart	employs	the	phrase	“rule	of	recognition”	in	these	passages	as	
well,	but	the	phrase	is	a	misnomer	in	that	what	Hart	refers	to	is	not	a	norm	that	
officials	use	to	determine	what	to	do	or	to	believe	but	to	the	social	fact	constituted	
by	officials’	practice	of	holding	themselves	and	one	another	accountable.		Talk	of	a	
rule	of	recognition	here	is	ontological,	a	description	of	what	makes	it	the	case	that	
rules	R1,	R2,	Rn	are	rules	of	the	society	in	question.		Put	another	way,	it	is	an	
account	of	the	truth	conditions	for	candidate	rules	of	recognition	that	play	an	
epistemic	role,	i.e.	statements	that	purport	to	provide	actors	with	authoritative	
descriptions	of	officials’	practice	of	holding	themselves	and	one	another	
accountable.28				
																																																								
can	channel	and	in	that	way	constrain	a	practice’s	development.		But	this	is	fully	consistent	with	the	
claim	that	it	is	the	practice	of	holding	accountable	itself	that	makes	it	the	case	that	the	rules	that	
regulate	a	given	society	are	what	they	are.	
28	In	many	societies,	the	practice	of	holding	accountable	that	constitutes	the	existence	of	law	
encompasses	subjects	or	citizens	as	well	as	officials,	but	as	Hart	points	out,	that	is	not	strictly	
necessary	for	the	existence	of	a	legal	system;	i.e.	for	the	actual	social	world	to	approximate	the	one	
that	participants	in	the	practice	aim	to	create	through	their	practice	of	holding	accountable.	
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	 When	Hart	describes	as	necessary	and	sufficient	for	the	existence	of	a	legal	
system	in	a	given	society	general	obedience	to	the	law	on	the	part	of	private	citizens,	
i.e.	subjects,	and	its	officials’	“effective	acceptance”	of	common	rules	for	identifying,	
changing,	and	adjudicating	the	law,	he	offers	a	response	to	the	ontological	question	
“what	makes	law?”29		But	why	think	satisfaction	of	both	conditions	is	necessary,	and	
not	merely	sufficient,	for	the	existence	of	law,	or	more	accurately,	of	a	legal	system?		
The	answer	is	that	only	when	both	conditions	are	satisfied	(to	some	considerable	
degree)	will	a	society	have	achieved	a	division	of	labor	in	sustaining	the	practice	of	
holding	accountable	that	constitutes	law	that	marks	the	transition	from	a	primitive	
to	an	advanced	social	order.		As	Hart	writes:			
The	assertion	that	a	legal	system	exists	is	therefore	a	Janus-faced	
statement	looking	both	towards	obedience	by	ordinary	citizens	and	to	
the	acceptance	by	officials	of	secondary	rules	as	critical	common	
standards	of	official	behaviour.		[This]…	is	merely	the	reflection	of	the	
composite	character	of	a	legal	system	as	compared	with	a	simpler	
decentralized	pre-legal	form	of	social	structure	which	consists	only	of	
primary	rules.		In	the	simpler	structure,	since	there	are	no	officials,	
the	rules	must	be	widely	accepted	as	setting	critical	standards	for	the	
behaviour	of	the	group.		If,	there,	the	internal	point	of	view	is	not	
widely	disseminated	there	could	not	logically	be	any	rules.		But	where	
there	is	a	union	of	primary	and	secondary	rules,	which	is,	as	we	have	
																																																								
29	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	116.	
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argued,	the	most	fruitful	way	of	regarding	a	legal	system,	the	
acceptance	of	the	rules	as	common	standards	for	the	group	may	be	
split	off	from	the	relatively	passive	matter	of	the	ordinary	individual	
acquiescing	in	the	rules	by	obeying	them	for	his	part	alone.		In	an	
extreme	case	the	internal	point	of	view	with	its	characteristic	
normative	use	of	legal	language	(‘This	is	a	valid	rule’)	might	be	
confined	to	the	official	world.		In	this	more	complex	system,	only	
officials	might	accept	and	use	the	system’s	criteria	of	legal	validity.30	
If	we	ignore	the	unfortunate	phrase	“which	consists	only	of	primary	rules,”	there	
can	be	no	doubt	that,	for	Hart,	one	critical,	indeed	“most	fruitful,”	way	to	distinguish	
an	advanced	legal	system	from	a	simple	legal	order	is	on	the	basis	of	specialization	
in	the	performance	of	governance	tasks.31			
In	sum,	when	Hart	invokes	the	concept	of	a	rule	of	recognition	that	serves	the	
epistemic	function	of	identifying	a	society’s	rules	and	their	scope,	reference	to	a	
‘legal	system’	refers	to	a	hierarchy	of	rules.		In	contrast,	when	Hart	invokes	the	
concept	of	a	rule	of	recognition	as	part	of	his	ontological	account	of	what	makes	law,	
reference	to	a	‘legal	system’	refers	to	a	hierarchy	of	actors,	of	officials	and	subjects,	
or	rulers	and	ruled.	
II	
																																																								
30	Id.,	117.	
31	Or	perhaps	it	is	only	the	modifier	“of	obligation”	that	Hart	so	often	attaches	to	“primary	rules”	that	
we	should	abandon,	in	which	case	the	primary/secondary	distinction	becomes	synonymous	with	the	
absence	or	presence	of	a	division	of	labor	in	governance.	
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	 With	a	clearer	understanding	of	the	two	(or	perhaps	three)	ways	Hart	
distinguishes	between	a	primitive	and	an	advanced	social	order,	as	well	as	the	two	
different	roles	reference	to	a	rule	of	recognition	plays	in	Hart’s	analysis	of	law,	we	
can	now	explicate	and	assess	Hart’s	characterization	of	international	law	in	chapter	
X.		An	explanation	of	how	and	why	criticisms	of	that	characterization	fail	to	hit	their	
mark	provides	an	especially	perspicuous	method	for	carrying	out	this	task.	 		
Waldron	develops	his	objections	to	Hart’s	views	on	international	law	by	
evaluating	“Hart’s	claim	that	the	international	legal	order	is	a	primitive	legal	system,	
consisting	of	nothing	but	primary	rules.”32		He	begins	by	pointing	out	that	
international	law	includes	secondary	rules	of	adjudication,	such	as	those	set	out	in	
the	statute	creating	the	International	Court	of	Justice	(ICJ),	as	well	as	secondary	
rules	of	change,	such	as	those	constitutive	of	the	treaty-making	process.		Clearly	
Hart	was	aware	of	these	features	of	international	law;	indeed,	he	explicitly	refers	to	
both	of	them	in	Ch.	X.		Therefore,	Waldron	attempts	to	extract	what	he	takes	to	be	
Hart’s	reasons	for	nevertheless	describing	international	law	as	a	relatively	simple	
social	order.		In	the	case	of	the	ICJ,	Waldron	maintains	it	is	the	lack	of	compulsory	
jurisdiction,	while	in	the	case	of	treaty	making	it	is	the	fact	that	the	resulting	rules	
																																																								
32	Waldron,	supra	note	4,	at	216.		Payandeh,	supra	note	5,	adopts	a	similar	strategy,	though	he	
sometimes	runs	together	claims	regarding	the	development	of	secondary	rules	for	addressing	
uncertainty,	rigidity,	and	inefficiency	with	the	development	of	specialization	in	the	performance	of	
governance	tasks.		See	also	Capps,	supra	note	2,	at	213;	LIAM	MURPHY,	WHAT	MAKES	LAW	(2014),	
at	147-50.	
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do	not	apply	to	non-parties.33		Though	Waldron	concedes	that	the	absence	of	
compulsory	jurisdiction	marks	a	significant	disanalogy	between	a	municipal	legal	
system	and	international	law,	he	points	out	that	this	does	not	warrant	the	inference	
that	international	law	contains	no	rules	of	adjudication.34		As	for	the	fact	that	
treaties	do	not	apply	to	non-parties,	Waldron	writes:	“it	is	not	clear	why	the	point	
about	‘binding	states	that	are	not	parties’	should	be	jurisprudentially	so	important,”	
and	in	particular,	why	Hart	should	apparently	treat	it	as	a	necessary	condition	for	
the	existence	of	rules	of	change.35	
	 Waldron	follows	Payandeh	in	attributing	Hart’s	“poor	reasoning”	to	an	
unwarranted	assumption	that	the	functions	secondary	rules	perform,	namely	
mitigating	uncertainty,	rigidity,	and	inefficiency,	require	the	existence	of	the	specific	
institutions	found	in	a	municipal	legal	system,	such	as	that	of	a	legislature	or	courts	
with	wide-ranging	compulsory	jurisdiction.36			
If	the	main	distinction	between	the	social	rules	of	a	primitive	society	
and	a	more	sophisticated	legal	system	lies	in	the	ability	of	the	latter	to	
address	the	problems	of	uncertainty,	of	the	static	character	of	the	
social	rules,	and	of	the	inefficiency	of	the	system	in	enforcing	the	
rules,	then	there	is	no	compelling	reason	why	an	international	legal	
order	needs	to	resemble	the	domestic	legal	order	in	form	–	the	lack	of	
																																																								
33	Waldron,	supra	note	4,	at	215	and	217.	
34	Id.,	at	215-16.	
35	Id.,	at	217.	
36	Id.,	at	214-15.	
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which	is	the	main	reason	for	Hart	to	qualify	international	law	not	as	a	
system	but	only	as	a	set	of	rules.		…[I]t	is	more	convincing	to	ask	
whether	the	international	order	comprises	structures	which	
effectively	fulfill	legislative,	judicative,	and	executive	functions	which	
overcome	the	defects	of	a	primitive	social	system.		If	it	fulfills	this	
requirement	there	are	no	grounds	to	deny	international	law	the	status	
of	a	legal	system.37			
The	problem	with	both	Waldron	and	Payandeh’s	critiques	is	that	“the	main	
distinction”	Hart	draws	between	a	primitive	and	an	advanced	society,	or	at	least	the	
one	he	employs	when	he	describes	international	law	as	akin	to	a	simple	social	order,	
is	not	the	functional	one	Waldron	and	Payandeh	asssume.		Rather,	it	is	the	absence	
or	presence,	respectively,	of	a	division	of	labor	in	the	carrying	out	of	those	tasks	in	
virtue	of	which	a	legal	system	can	rightly	be	said	to	exist.			
	 Why	accept	this	claim?		Start	with	the	fact	that	Hart	tells	us	so	in	the	
introductory	section	of	chapter	X,	where	he	writes:	“it	is	indeed	arguable,	as	we	shall	
show,	that	international	law	not	only	lacks	the	secondary	rules	of	change	and	
adjudication	which	provide	for	legislature	and	courts…”38		The	claim	here	concerns	
the	absence	of	specific	kinds	of	secondary	rules,	not	the	absence	of	secondary	rules	
tout	court.		Recall	as	well	that	when	Hart	first	introduces	the	idea	of	a	simple	society	
that	lacks	rules	of	change	he	distinguishes	between	the	absence	of	even	an	
																																																								
37	Payandeh,	supra	note	5,	at	981.		In	what	respect	is	such	an	analysis	“more	convincing?”		I	address	
this	question,	and	rebut	Payandeh’s	assertion,	in	the	following	section.			
38	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	214,	italics	added.	
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embryonic	form	of	legislation,	i.e.	rules	constitutive	of	a	process	that	makes	possible	
deliberate	change	to	general	rules	and	that	introduce	the	germ	of	the	idea	of	a	
distinction	between	ruler	and	ruled,	and	rules	that	make	possible	changes	to	
“obligations	which	arise	under	the	rules	in	particular	cases.”39		The	secondary	rules	
that	constitute	treaty-making	are	examples	of	this	second	type	of	rules	of	change;	
they	alter	obligations	that	obtain	under	the	general	rules	of	international	law	only	
for	the	particular	states	that	sign	(and,	if	necessary,	ratify)	them.40		As	Hart	notes	in	
the	final	paragraph	of	Chapter	X,	were	international	law	to	evolve	so	that	multi-
lateral	treaties	were	generally	recognized	as	binding	states	that	were	not	parties	to	
them,	then	the	norms	that	comprise	international	law	would	include	secondary	
rules	that	provide	for	legislation,	i.e.	the	ability	to	make	deliberate	changes	to	
general	rules	in	advance	of	any	actor	using	them	to	hold	himself	or	others	
accountable.		It	would	also	include	the	distinct	categories	of	rulers	(or	officials)	and	
ruled	(or	subjects),	and	so	constitute	a	vertical	organization	that	contrasts	with	the	
common	description	of	international	society	as	a	horizontal	order.		Thus	we	have	an	
																																																								
39	Id.,	at	92-3.	
40	Waldron	is	right,	then,	to	observe	the	parallel	between	actors	entering	into	contracts	within	a	
municipal	legal	order	and	states	entering	into	treaties	within	the	international	one,	and	to	note	that	
the	intelligibility	of	both	types	of	conduct	requires	postulating	rules	of	change	(Waldron,	supra	note	
4,	at	217).		But	he	errs	in	concluding	that	this	observation	undermines	Hart’s	characterization	of	
international	law	as	primitive	because	Hart’s	claim	rests	not	on	the	absence	of	any	secondary	rules	at	
all	but	on	the	absence	of	a	division	of	labor	in	the	making	of	rules	that	apply	generally	to	members	of	
society,	i.e.	independent	of	each	(particular)	member	willingly	submitting	to	those	rules.			
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answer	to	Waldron’s	question	quoted	above	regarding	the	jurisprudential	
significance	of	‘binding	states	that	are	not	parties’	to	a	treaty;	such	a	practice	is	
sufficient	for	the	existence	of	a	division	of	labor	in	making	changes	to	the	general	
rules	that	regulate	members	of	international	society,	and	it	is	the	development	of	
specialization	in	this	and	other	governance	tasks	that	transforms	a	given	society	
from	primitive	to	advanced.		
	 Consider,	now,	Hart’s	remarks	on	international	adjudication	and	
enforcement.41		He	concedes	that	with	respect	to	each	of	these	components	of	
governance	there	is	some	analogy	between	municipal	and	international	law.		In	the	
case	of	enforcement	international	law	includes	“secondary	rules	specifying	or	at	
least	limiting	the	penalties	for	violation,”	which	might	make	some	contribution	to	
reducing	“the	smouldering	vendettas	which	may	result	from	self-help.”42		But	to	the	
extent	these	vendettas	occur	primarily	because	of	the	“absence	of	an	official	
monopoly	on	sanctions,”	with	an	emphasis	on	both	monopoly	and	official(s),	the	fact	
that	international	law	relies	almost	exclusively	on	self-help	does	indeed	make	it	
																																																								
41	These	appear	primarily	in	the	last	section	of	Ch.	X,	where	once	again	Hart	indicates	that	his	
concern	is	with	the	existence	of	specialization	in	the	performance	of	governance	tasks,	albeit	in	terms	
that	invoke	the	now	familiar	conflation	of	the	functional	and	specialization	grounds	for	
distinguishing	primitive	from	advanced	societies.		The	first	two	sentences	of	this	section	read	as	
follows:	“To	the	innocent	eye,	the	formal	structure	of	international	law,	lacking	a	legislature,	courts	
with	compulsory	jurisdiction	and	officially	organized	sanctions,	appears	very	different	from	that	of	
municipal	law.		It	resembles,	as	we	have	said,	in	form	though	not	at	all	in	content,	a	simple	regime	of	
primary	or	customary	law”	(Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	232).	
42	Id.,	at	97	and	93.	
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quite	like	a	simple	social	order.43		Payandeh’s	observation	that	at	present	all	states	
enjoy	a	right	to	enforce	a	limited	number	of	international	legal	norms	poses	little	
challenge	to	this	conclusion,	both	empirically	and	in	terms	of	its	fit	with	Hart’s	
description	of	a	primitive	society	as	one	in	which	enforcement	is	“left	to	the	
individuals	affected	or	to	the	group	at	large.”44		Hart	does	briefly	argue	earlier	in	
chapter	X	that	reliance	on	self-help	to	enforce	the	law	may	pose	less	of	a	threat	to	
the	existence	of	a	stable	social	order	in	the	international	context	than	it	does	in	the	
domestic	one.45		But	he	also	points	out	that	the	same	facts	that	explain	why	there	is	
less	need	for	an	advanced	legal	system	to	produce	a	stable	social	order	explain	why	
it	is	less	likely	that	such	a	system	will	develop	in	the	international	context,	i.e.	why	
some	and	perhaps	even	many	international	actors	will	not	judge	it	to	be	in	their	
interest	all	things	considered.		Note	that	this	is	an	empirical	claim,	and	conditional	
on	certain	facts	that	may	turn	out	to	be	contingent.		It	is	consistent,	for	example,	
with	the	possibility	that	economic	or	environmental	changes	may	lead	states	to	
																																																								
43	Id.,	at	93.	Hart	and	Kelsen	agree	on	this	point,	with	the	latter	stating	that	in	the	international	legal	
order	“the	technique	of	self-help,	characteristic	of	primitive	law,	prevails.”		See	Hans	Kelsen,	PURE	
THEORY	OF	LAW	(1967)	at	323.	
44	Id.,	at	93,	italics	added.	Payandeh,	supra	note	5,	at	988.	
45	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	218-20.	
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engage	in	greater	transfers	of	jurisdiction	to	international	organizations	(and	the	
officials	that	populate	them)	than	was	true	when	Hart	wrote	The	Concept	of	Law.46				
With	respect	to	adjudication,	international	law	clearly	differs	somewhat	from	
a	primitive	society	in	that	it	contains	secondary	rules	“empowering	individuals	to	
make	authoritative	determinations	of	the	question	whether,	on	a	particular	
occasion,	a	primary	rule	has	been	broken.”47		Recall,	however,	that	the	defect	that	
Hart	believes	courts	and	other	adjudicatory	bodies	serve	to	mitigate	is	the	fact	that	
“disputes	as	to	whether	an	admitted	rule	has	or	has	not	been	violated	will…	
continue	interminably,	if	there	is	no	agency	specially	empowered	to	ascertain	
finally,	and	authoritatively,	the	fact	of	violation.”48		Insofar	as	courts	without	
compulsory	jurisdiction	lack	this	authority	except	in	cases	where	parties	to	a	
dispute	voluntarily	place	themselves	under	it,	Hart	likely	concluded	that	their	
existence	marks	only	a	small	advance	in	international	law’s	contribution	to	the	
production	of	social	order.		He	may	have	been	mistaken	on	this	score;	arguably,	a	
number	of	ICJ	decisions	have	made	significant	contributions	to	how	states	
understand	their	legal	obligations,	rights,	etc.,	and	in	so	doing	shaped	their	conduct	
in	ways	that	would	not	have	occurred	in	the	absence	of	a	World	Court.		Moreover,	
the	proliferation	within	international	law	over	the	past	few	decades	of	adjudicatory	
																																																								
46	For	an	excellent	contemporary	exposition	of	this	approach	to	analyzing	international	law	and	how	
it	contributes	to	the	production	of	social	order,	one	at	which	Hart	only	gestured,	see	JOEL	
TRACHTMAN,	THE	ECONOMIC	STRUCTURE	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	(2008).	
47	Hart,	supra	note	2,	at	96.	
48	Id.,	at	93.	
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bodies	with	compulsory	jurisdiction,	not	to	mention	increasing	engagement	with	
international	law	by	domestic	courts,	is	surely	the	area	of	governance	in	which	
international	law	has	moved	furthest	away	from	a	simple	social	order	(or,	if	you	
prefer,	closest	to	an	advanced	one).49		Nevertheless,	if	Hart’s	interest	in	the	
development	of	a	division	of	labor	in	governance	was	motivated	by	the	belief	that	it	
makes	law	a	more	effective	tool	for	social	control,	then	it	was	not	implausible	for	
him	to	conclude	that	a	society	that	possesses	only	a	court	without	compulsory	
jurisdiction	was	in	this	respect	more	like	a	social	order	that	lacked	any	division	of	
labor	in	adjudication	than	one	equipped	with	compulsory	courts	of	wide-ranging	
jurisdiction.	
It	is	worth	emphasizing	here	a	point	that	both	Hart	and	his	critics	make,	
though	they	then	often	ignore	it:	the	property	of	being	a	primitive	or	advanced	
society	is	scalar,	not	bimodal.50		While	Hart	does	sometimes	group	primitive	and	
international	law	together	in	a	way	that	suggests	they	are	equivalent,	at	other	times	
he	offers	a	more	nuanced	characterization	of	international	law.		For	example,	in	the	
introduction	to	Ch.	X	he	writes:	“…the	absence	of	an	international	legislature,	courts	
																																																								
49	See	Payandeh,	supra	note	5,	at	985-6.		See	also	Terry	Nardin,	LAW,	MORALITY,	AND	THE	
RELATIONS	OF	STATES	(1983),	at	156-66.			
50	See,	e.g.,	Waldron	who	shifts	over	the	course	of	his	discussion	from	describing	Hart’s	view	of	
international	law	as	characterizing	“international	law	as,	in	many	respects,	more	like	a	system	of	
‘primitive’	law	than	like	a	municipal	legal	system”	(Waldron,	supra	note	4,	at	209,	italics	added)	to	
describing	Hart	as	“claim[ing]	that	the	international	order	is	a	primitive	legal	system”	(Id.,	at	216,	
italics	added).	
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with	compulsory	jurisdiction,	and	centrally	organized	sanctions…	means	that	the	
rules	for	states	resemble	that	simple	form	of	social	structure…	which	when	we	find	it	
among	societies	of	individuals,	we	are	accustomed	to	contrast	with	a	developed	
legal	system.”51		The	argument	in	the	proceeding	paragraph	takes	this	talk	of	
resemblance	seriously,	not	least	because	it	directs	our	attention	away	from	the	
metaphysical-conceptual	parlor	game	of	determining,	for	its	own	sake,	what	is	law,	
and	towards	the	“more	fruitful”	and	empirically	informed	study	of	how	rules	and	
institutions	function	to	produce	social	order.					
	 Hart	takes	up	the	question	of	whether	international	law	contains	a	rule	of	
recognition	as	a	response	to	Kelsen’s	a	priori	assertion	that	it	must.		I	discuss	some	
of	the	details	of	that	argument	below.		Here	I	consider	the	position	Hart	stakes	out	at	
its	conclusion,	namely	that:	“there	is	no	basic	rule	providing	general	criteria	of	
validity	for	the	rules	of	international	law,	and	that	the	rules	which	are	in	fact	
operative	constitute	not	a	system	but	a	set	of	rules,	among	which	are	the	rules	
providing	for	the	binding	force	of	treaties.”52		In	the	previous	section	I	distinguished	
two	functions	that	reference	to	a	rule	of	recognition	plays	in	Hart’s	analysis	of	law	or	
a	legal	system.		The	first	is	an	epistemic	function:	a	rule	of	recognition	provides	(or	
purports	to	provide)	an	epistemically	authoritative	description	of	what	counts	as	
law	in	a	given	legal	order,	i.e.	an	account	of	the	sources	of	law	in	that	society,	
possibly	including	a	description	of	which	laws	take	priority	over	others	in	the	event	
																																																								
51	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	214,	italics	added.	
52	Id.,	at	236.	
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of	(apparent)	conflict	between	them.53		Understood	in	these	terms,	the	claim	that	
international	law	possesses	no	rule	of	recognition	is	false,	as	both	Payandeh	and	
Waldron	point	out.		For	example,	both	note	that	Article	38(1)	of	the	ICJ	Statute	and	
the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties	provide	authoritative	means	for	
identifying	international	law.54		As	for	systematizing	international	legal	norms	in	the	
sense	of	identifying	rules	that	regulate	conflicts	between	them	(or,	perhaps	better,	
specify	their	scope	so	that	they	do	not	conflict),	Payandeh	identifies	the	existence	of	
a	number	of	international	rules	that	serve	this	function	(albeit	not	on	the	basis	of	a	
law’s	source).55		Furthermore,	both	Payandeh	and	Waldron	take	Hart	to	task	for	
making	it	a	condition	for	international	law	to	qualify	as	a	legal	system	that	it	
manifest	a	level	of	systematicity	in	this	respect	that	does	not	obtain	in	many	
municipal	legal	orders,	especially	in	the	case	of	constitutional	law.56		While	all	of	
																																																								
53	The	rule	is	an	epistemic	authority,	recall,	because	it	is	the	actual	practice	of	holding	accountable,	
not	a	description	of	that	practice,	that	determines	what	the	law	of	a	given	community	is.	
54	Waldron,	supra	note	4,	at	219;	Payandeh,	supra	note	5,	at	989-90.	
55	Payandeh,	supra	note	5,	at	992.	
56	Payandeh,	supra	note	5,	at	991;	Waldron,	supra	note	4,	at	220-21.		Payandeh,	Id.,	at	985-6,	in	
particular	makes	much	of	the	fact	that	the	constitutional	law	of	a	domestic	state	is	characterized	by	a	
degree	of	uncertainty	similar	to	that	present	in	the	case	of	international	law,	and	that	at	least	in	some	
such	states,	there	exists	no	specialized	body	charged	with	adjudicating	such	disputes.		Had	Hart	only	
acknowledged	that	fact,	Payandeh	maintains,	he	would	not	have	offered	as	“antagonistic”	a	divide	
between	international	and	municipal	law	as	is	suggested	by	the	description	of	the	former	as	
primitive	and	the	latter	as	advanced.		The	argument	fails	to	persuade,	however,	because	in	a	well-
functioning	municipal	legal	order	constitutional	disputes	typically	leave	much	existing	law	settled.		
	 28	
these	claims	are	correct,	they	fail	to	address	Hart’s	assertion	that	international	law	
lacks	a	rule	of	recognition	and	that	therefore	it	does	not	count	as	a	legal	system.		
That	is	because	in	making	this	claim	Hart	invokes	the	ontological,	not	the	epistemic,	
function	that	reference	to	the	rule	of	recognition	plays	in	his	analysis	of	law.57	
	 Recall	that	in	Ch.	VI	Hart	maintains	that	a	legal	system	exists	when	citizens	or	
subjects	generally	obey	the	law	while	officials	use	it	as	a	critical	common	standard	
of	behavior.		This	“composite	character”	is	what	distinguishes	a	legal	system	from	“a	
simpler	decentralized	pre-legal	form	of	social	structure.”58		A	legal	system,	then,	is	a	
social	order	characterized	by	a	significant	division	of	labor	in	sustaining	the	practice	
of	holding	accountable	that	constitutes	a	given	society’s	law.		Put	another	way,	what	
																																																								
Whatever	uncertainty	and	inefficiency	attaches	to	those	disputes	has	far	less	impact	on	municipal	
law’s	ability	to	contribute	to	the	production	of	social	order	than	is	true	in	the	case	of	international	
law,	where	a	far	wider	range	of	norms	are	subject	to	these	defects.		(Note:	this	claim	concerns	law’s	
contribution	to	producing	social	order,	not	the	degree	to	which	a	stable	social	order	obtains).		If	we	
keep	in	mind	that	the	simplicity	or	complexity	of	a	legal	system	is	a	matter	of	degree,	and	recall	that	
Hart	was	well	aware	of	the	fact	that	municipal	legal	systems	sometimes	suffer	from	constitutional	
crises	that	inhibit	their	value	as	a	means	for	social	control	(Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	122-3),	then	the	
comparison	between	municipal	constitutional	law	and	international	law	does	little	to	weaken	Hart’s	
case	for	characterizing	the	latter	as	akin	to	a	primitive	social	order		
57	Other	theorists	who	criticize	Hart’s	assertion	that	international	lacks	a	rule	of	recognition	because	
they	mistakenly	believe	that	what	Hart	has	in	mind	when	he	makes	this	claim	is	an	epistemically	
authoritative	rule	for	identifying	international	law	include	von	Hoof,	supra	note	6,	at	55-6;	Capps,	
supra	note	2,	at	214;	and	Benedict	Kingsbury,	The	Concept	of	Law	in	Global	Administrative	Law,	20	
EUROPEAN	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	23	(2009),	at	28.				
58	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	117.	
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makes	law	(i.e.	accounts	for	its	existence)	in	a	society	that	possesses	a	legal	system	
is	the	practice	of	secondary	rules	of	change,	adjudication,	and	enforcement	by	one	
set	of	actors	(officials)	who	rule	over	another	set	of	actors	(citizens).59		Given	this	
characterization	of	what	it	is	for	a	society	to	possess	a	legal	system,	Hart’s	assertion	
that	the	rules	that	comprise	international	law	constitute	not	a	system	but	only	a	set	
seems	quite	plausible.		Indeed,	neither	Waldron	nor	Payandeh	deny	it,	nor	do	most	
international	legal	theorists	except	those	who	mistakenly	think	international	law’s	
status	as	law	depends	on	its	possessing	such	a	division	of	labor.		Of	course,	it	is	
precisely	this	mistake	that	Hart	aims	to	rebut	in	the	final	section	of	Ch.	X.60		Thus	
Payandeh	errs	when	he	claims	that	“Hart	offers	no	compelling	reason	why	a	legal	
system	would	have	to	closely	resemble	the	archetype	of	the	municipal	legal	order	of	
a	modern	constitutional	state.”61		To	count	as	a	legal	system	in	the	sense	that	
concerns	Hart	here	just	is	to	possess	the	division	of	labor	in	governance	(e.g.	a	
																																																								
59	Particular	individuals	may	be	members	of	both	sets,	of	course,	or	there	may	be	no	overlap	of	
membership	at	all	between	the	two.		A	complete	overlap	of	membership	marks	the	limiting	case	I	
characterized	in	the	previous	section	as	the	germ	of	a	legal	system.	
60	No	less	an	authority	on	the	history	of	international	law	than	Martti	Koskenniemi	testifies	to	the	
mistaken	acceptance	of	this	assumption,	describing	international	lawyers	“past	strategy	to	defend	
international	law	by	a	domestic	analogy:	the	assumption	that	treaties	were	a	kind	of	legislation,	
peaceful	settlements	of	disputes	a	type	of	adjudication,	and	war	and	counter-measures	a	primitive	
form	of	enforcement.”		See	M.	Koskenniemi	and	P.	Leino,	Fragmentation	of	International	Law?	
Postmodern	Anxieties,	15	LEIDEN	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	553	(2002),	at	558.				
61	Payandeh,	supra	note	5,	at	981.	
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legislature,	courts,	etc.)	realized	in	modern	states	and	social	orders	that	resemble	
them	in	this	respect	(e.g.	the	Roman	Empire,	or	the	Catholic	Church).62	
Hart	not	only	denies	international	law	the	status	of	a	legal	system,	he	also	
asserts	that	it	lacks	a	rule	of	recognition.		Even	if	we	restrict	our	interest	to	the	
ontological	question	of	what	accounts	for	the	existence	of	law,	this	claim	appears	
false.		For	we	can	formulate	the	following	“rule”	of	recognition	for	a	primitive	
society,	a	description	of	the	conditions	under	which	rules	regulate	(some	of)	the	
conduct	of	its	members:	rule	R1,	R2,	etc.	are	rules	of	primitive	society	P	if	and	only	if	
its	members	“use	the	rules	as	standards	for	the	appraisal	of	their	own	and	others’	
behaviour.”63		But	in	fact	Hart	does	not	deny	that	we	can	formulate	such	a	rule,	only	
the	utility	of	doing	so.		Speaking	of	the	“strange	basic	norm	which	has	been	
suggested	for	international	law:	‘States	should	behave	as	they	have	customarily	
behaved,’”	Hart	writes:	“we	may	be	persuaded	to	treat	as	a	basic	rule,	something	
which	is	an	empty	repetition	of	the	mere	fact	that	the	society	concerned	(whether	of	
individuals	or	states)	observes	certain	standards	of	conduct	as	obligatory	rules”64		
In	contrast,	where	a	society	is	characterized	by	a	division	of	labor	in	the	
performance	of	governance	tasks,	the	formulation	of	a	“rule”	of	recognition	shines	
																																																								
62	The	legal	theorist	who	comes	closest	to	accurately	describing	Hart’s	position	as	set	out	in	the	text	
is	Alexander	Somek,	who	suggests	that	the	point	would	be	better	stated	in	terms	of	international	
law’s	constitutional	deficiency.		See	Alexander	Somek,	Kelsen	Lives,	18	EUROPEAN	JOURNAL	OF	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	409-451	(2007),	at	433.		
63	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	98.	
64	Id.,	at	236.	
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new	light	on	how	law	contributes	to	the	production	of	social	order	by	calling	our	
attention	to	the	fact	that	it	is	the	conduct	of	officials,	actors	occupying	offices	
constituted	by	rules	that	empower	them	to	make,	apply,	and	enforce	the	law,	that	
accounts	for	law’s	existence.		Likewise,	in	a	primitive	society	the	claim	‘This	is	a	
valid	law’	amounts	to	nothing	more	than	the	empty	claim	‘this	is	a	law	of	our	society	
because	it	is	a	law	of	our	society	(i.e.	because	we	treat	it	as	such),’	whereas	once	a	
division	of	labor	in	governance	occurs	the	claim	‘This	is	a	valid	law’	can	be	
theoretically	informative;	e.g.	‘This	is	a	valid	law	because	it	was	enacted	by	the	
Queen	in	Parliament.’		Thus	with	some	minor	rephrasing	we	can	better	convey	the	
idea	Hart	meant	to	express	in	the	passage	quoted	above:	there	is	no	theoretically	
useful	basic	rule	in	the	international	legal	order	of	the	sort	that	could	provide	
informative	general	criteria	of	validity.		This	reflects	the	fact	that	there	is	relatively	
little	division	of	labor	in	the	performance	of	the	governance	tasks	that	constitute	
international	law.		It	is,	in	this	respect,	not	a	legal	system,	and	therefore	bears	a	
closer	resemblance	to	a	simple	or	primitive	social	order	than	to	an	advanced	social	
order	like	the	one	realized	in	a	well-functioning	modern	state.65	
																																																								
65	On	this	point,	see	also	Richard	Collins,	THE	INSTITUTIONAL	PROBLEM	IN	MODERN	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	(2016),	at	83.		As	Hart	notes,	however,	a	legal	system	that	exists	in	virtue	of	
secondary	rules	that	create	the	office	of	judge	and	the	institution	of	a	court	“is	necessarily	also	
committed	to	a	rule	of	recognition	of	an	elementary	and	imperfect	sort”	(Id.,	at	97).		One	might	point	
to	the	recent	growth	of	adjudicatory	panels	and	semi-autonomous	administrative	rule-making	bodies	
in	various	domains	of	international	law	to	make	the	case	that	it	is	now	possible	to	formulate	a	
theoretically	useful	ontological	“rule”	of	recognition	for	international	law.		Doing	so	will	require	
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	 The	foregoing	interpretation	of	Hart’s	claim	that	international	law	lacks	a	
rule	of	recognition	and	does	not	constitute	a	legal	system	casts	an	illuminating	light	
on	some	of	the	remarks	he	makes	in	the	course	of	his	criticism	of	Kelsen.		
Admittedly	this	interpretation	requires	a	departure	from	the	text,	and	in	particular,	
a	focus	on	agents	rather	than	rules.		Nevertheless,	I	suggest	that	the	arguments	
presented	thus	far	in	this	paper	warrant	such	a	departure.		To	begin,	rather	than	
assume	that	Hart	understands	‘rule	of	recognition’	and	‘validity’	epistemically,	and	
so	conclude	that	he	is	talking	past	Kelsen,	we	should	instead	take	Hart	to	be	
engaging	directly	with	Kelsen	by	making	an	ontological	claim	regarding	the	
existence	conditions	for	norms.66		Contra	Kelsen,	Hart	asserts	that	the	existence	of	
international	legal	norms	or	rules	does	not	require	a	Grundnorm.			
																																																								
responding	to	skepticism	regarding	the	genuine	autonomy	enjoyed	by	these	administrative	rule-
making	bodies,	and	rebutting	the	claim	that	the	decisions	of	adjudicatory	panels	are	merely	
epistemically	authoritative	claims	regarding	states’	practice	of	holding	accountable,	but	not	
themselves	part	of	that	practice	(i.e.	part	of	what	makes	international	law	what	it	is).		Whether	one	
treats	the	European	Union	and	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	as	components	of	international	
law	will	likely	also	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	position	one	takes.					
66	Waldron’s	suggestion	that	Hart’s	remarks	in	these	paragraphs	reflect	a	confusion	on	his	part	rests	
on	the	assumption	that	the	rule	of	recognition	plays	a	different	(i.e.	epistemic)	role	in	Hart’s	analysis	
of	law	than	the	Grundnorm	plays	in	Kelsen’s	analysis	of	law	(Waldron,	supra	note	4,	at	221).		See	also	
Murphy,	supra	note	32,	at	147.		My	reading	of	Hart’s	argument	suggests	otherwise,	with	Hart	
countering	Kelsen’s	transcendental	account	of	law’s	normativity	by	pointing	to	(though	not	
developing	in	this	passage)	a	naturalistic	account	of	normativity	originating	in	the	human	practice	of	
holding	accountable.		For	a	sketch	of	such	an	approach,	see	David	Lefkowitz,	Giving	Up	On	Moral	
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…[I]t	is	surely	conceivable	(and	perhaps	has	often	been	the	case)	that	
a	society	may	live	by	rules	imposing	obligations	on	its	members	as	
‘binding’…		[I]f	rules	are	in	fact	accepted	as	standards	of	conduct,	and	
supported	with	appropriate	forms	of	social	pressure	distinctive	of	
obligatory	rules,	nothing	more	is	required	to	show	that	they	are	
binding	rules.67			
It	is	true,	Hart	concedes,	that	in	this		
simpler	case	we	cannot	ask:	‘From	what	ultimate	provision	of	the	
system	do	the	separate	rules	derive	their	validity	or	‘binding	force’?’		
For	there	is	no	such	provision	and	need	be	none.		It	is,	therefore,	a	
mistake	to	suppose	that	a	basic	rule	of	recognition	is	a	generally	
necessary	condition	of	the	existence	of	rules	of	obligation	or	‘binding’	
rules.		In	the	simpler	form	of	society	we	must	wait	and	see	whether	a	
rule	gets	accepted	as	a	rule	or	not;	in	a	system	with	a	basic	rule	of	
recognition	we	can	say	before	a	rule	is	actually	made,	that	it	will	be	
valid	if	it	conforms	to	the	requirements	of	the	rule	of	recognition.68			
Take	this	last	sentence	first.		I	suggest	that	it	should	be	read	as	follows:	in	a	legal	
system,	i.e.	a	social	order	characterized	by	specialization	in	the	performance	of	
governance	tasks,	observers	and	participants	can	state	correctly	that	R1	is	a	rule	of	
																																																								
Truth	Shall	Set	You	Free:	Walzer	on	Relativism,	Criticism,	and	Toleration,	274	REVUE	
INTERNATIONALE	DE	PHILOSOPHIE	(2015).			
67	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	234.	
68	Id.,	at	235.	
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that	society	in	advance	of	any	actor	using	it	to	hold	himself	or	another	accountable.		
We	can	make	this	claim	because	there	exists,	and	we	can	point	to,	a	practice	of	
legislation	(including,	in	some	cases,	by	courts)	in	virtue	of	which	it	is	possible	to	
make	deliberate	changes	to	the	society’s	general	rules.		This	is	not	possible	in	a	
simpler	society,	one	that	relies	solely	on	a	customary	process	of	rule-formation,	in	
which	successful	rule	change	occurs	only	once	most	members	of	the	society	in	
question	use,	or	acknowledge	the	propriety	of	others	using,	R1	to	hold	themselves	
and	others	accountable.69		Of	course,	we	can	formulate	a	rule	that	tells	us	how	to	
identify	new	customary	rules	in	advance	of	their	being	practiced;	for	example,	we	
ought	to	believe	in	the	existence	of	a	customary	norm	C	if	(a)	actors	generally	
conduct	themselves	in	ways	that	comport	with	it	(or	try	to	hide	the	fact	when	they	
do	not),	and	(b)	we	have	reason	to	believe	they	do	so	out	of	a	sense	of	obligation,	or	
because	they	believe	C	is	a	norm	that	applies	to	them.70		However,	Hart’s	claim	here	
is	ontological,	not	epistemic,	or	so	I	contend.		Turning	now	to	the	other	sentences	in	
the	above	quotation,	the	existence	of	a	rule-governed	social	order	does	not	require	a	
hierarchy	of	agents	because	the	practice	of	holding	accountable	that	constitutes	
such	an	order	can	be	(and	often	has	been)	dispersed	among	all	the	members	of	the	
society	in	question.		It	is	a	mistake,	therefore,	to	assume	that	we	can,	let	alone	must,	
formulate	a	theoretically	useful	“rule”	of	recognition,	one	that	provides	us	with	an	
																																																								
69	See	Postema,	supra	note	18;	Lefkowitz,	supra	note	18.	
70	Indeed,	we	can	develop	very	sophisticated	epistemic	rules	of	this	sort;	see,	e.g.,	the	International	
Law	Commission’s	Draft	Reports	on	the	identification	of	customary	international	law,	available	at	
http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.shtml.	
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informative	description	of	what	makes	it	the	case	that	R1,	R2,	etc.,	are	valid	or	
‘binding’	rules	for	every	rule-guided	social	order.		Rather,	such	a	“rule”	“is	not	a	
necessity,	but	a	luxury,	found	in	advanced	social	systems;”	that	is,	in	social	systems	
characterized	by	a	division	of	labor	in	the	performance	of	governance	tasks.	
	 Liam	Murphy	speaks	for	many	when	he	writes:	“perhaps	the	main	reason	
these	last	pages	of	The	Concept	of	Law	are	confusing	is	that	there	is	a	disconnect	
between	Hart’s	theoretical	focus	on	the	rule	of	recognition	and	what	appears	to	be	
his	main	substantive	complaint	–	that	international	law,	lacking	a	legislature	and	(as	
he	appears	to	have	believed)	rules	of	change	generally,	is	a	static	legal	order.”71	My	
goal	in	this	section	has	been	to	demonstrate	that	this	disconnect	owes	to	Hart’s	
presentation	of	his	ideas,	but	not	to	those	ideas	themselves.	
III	
	 The	defense	of	Hart’s	take	on	international	law	presented	above	has	two	
important	implications.		First,	in	setting	the	record	straight	with	respect	to	what	
Hart	meant	when	he	characterized	international	law	as	akin	to	a	primitive	society,	it	
provides	a	basis	for	correcting	certain	other	erroneous	attacks	on	Hart	and	his	
analysis	of	law.		One	might	hope	(against	hope?)	that	this	contributes	at	least	in	
some	small	degree	to	legal	theorists’	collective	effort	to	improve	our	theoretical	
understanding	of	law,	as	well	as	our	moral	engagement	with	it.		Second,	and	
relatedly,	Hart’s	discussion	of	international	law	highlights	an	important	dimension	
of	law’s	ability	to	contribute	to	the	production	of	social	order.		In	doing	so,	it	adds	
																																																								
71	Murphy,	supra	note	32,	at	151-2.	
	 36	
further	impetus	to	an	already	flourishing	interdisciplinary	investigation	of	
international	law’s	effectiveness.		But	perhaps	more	importantly,	an	appreciation	of	
Hart’s	depiction	of	international	law,	properly	understood,	may	encourage	those	
legal	and	political	theorists	who	argue	for	international	legal	action	or	reform	to	be	
more	attentive	to	the	differences	between	the	international	legal	order	and	the	legal	
system	of	a	moderately	well-functioning	state.		
	 Waldron	considers	ever	so	briefly	the	possibility	that	Hart	means	exactly	
what	he	says	when	he	states	that	international	law	resembles	a	primitive	social	
order	in	virtue	of	its	lacking	“secondary	rules	of	change	and	adjudication	which	
provide	for	legislature	and	courts.”72		His	quick	dismissal	of	it	on	the	grounds	of	
triviality	is	doubly	mistaken,	however.73		First,	it	is	no	small	matter	to	concede	that	
international	law	is	largely	devoid	of	specialization	in	the	performance	of	
governance	tasks	given	that	one	of	Hart’s	goals	in	Ch.	X	is	to	rebut	those	who	argue	
or	assume	that	the	presence	of	such	specialization	is	at	least	a	necessary	condition	
for	classifying	international	law	with	municipal	law	as	law	properly	so-called.		
																																																								
72	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	214.	
73	Waldron,	supra	note	4,	at	214.		Arguably,	the	conclusions	of	a	theory	of	society	should	strike	
members	of	the	type	of	society	of	which	it	is	a	theory	as	trivial.		For	if	they	do	not	recognize	(some	
aspect	of)	themselves	and	their	way	of	life	in	the	theory,	even	if	in	a	less	flattering	light	than	they	
might	have	expected,	then	that	is	a	good	reason	to	conclude	the	theory	is	mistaken.		
Payandeh,	too,	momentarily	takes	Hart	at	his	word	before	rejecting	his	claim	on	the	basis	of	the	
mistaken	understanding	of	what	Hart	means	when	he	describes	international	law	as	primitive	
described	in	the	previous	section.		See	Payandeh,	supra	note	5,	at	994.	
	 37	
Second,	if	a	central	aim	of	The	Concept	of	Law	is	to	provide	an	account	of	how	law	
contributes	to	the	production	of	social	order,	then	it	seems	quite	plausible	to	
hypothesize	that	any	particular	legal	order’s	ability	to	perform	that	task	will	depend	
to	a	significant	degree	on	the	extent	of	specialization	in	the	conduct	of	governance	
tasks	that	characterizes	it.		Perhaps	that	observation	is	so	obvious	as	to	be	trivial?		
The	many	calls	for	international	action	and	reform	to	the	international	legal	order	
that	display	a	failure	to	take	seriously	or	even	recognize	the	limits	of	international	
law’s	ability	to	shape	the	social	world	suggest	otherwise.		Moreover,	Hart’s	
observation	that	municipal	law	includes	power-conferring	rules	is	similarly	trivial	in	
that	it	does	not	expose	us	to	a	phenomenon	with	which	we	are	unfamiliar	but	only	
calls	our	attention	to	a	fact	that	we	have	momentarily	lost	sight	of	under	the	
influence	of	bad	legal	theory.		The	bad	legal	theory	that	Hart	criticizes	in	his	
discussion	of	international	law,	the	conceptual	claim	regarding	law	that	threatens	to	
inhibit	productive	theoretical	inquiry	and	sound	moral	deliberation,	is	the	position	
that	only	if	it	possesses	those	features	characteristic	of	an	advanced	municipal	legal	
system,	such	as	a	legislature	and	compulsory	courts,	can	international	law	provide	a	
degree	of	social	control.		That	he	made	such	an	argument	renders	somewhat	ironic	
the	fact	that	Hart	is	so	often	tarred	and	feathered	for	the	alleged	crime	of	drawing	
unwarranted	conclusions	regarding	law	tout	court	on	the	basis	of	reflection	on	
municipal	law	alone.			
	 Hart	is	also	innocent	of	two	further	charges	Waldron	levels	against	him.		The	
first,	suggested	by	the	title	of	the	paper	in	which	Waldron	criticizes	Hart’s	take	on	
international	law,	is	that	the	latter	believed	international	law	to	be	“a	relatively	
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small	and	unimportant	part	of	jurisprudence.”		Waldron	plays	fast	and	loose	with	
the	text	of	The	Concept	of	Law	here.		What	Hart	actually	says	is	that:	“only	a	
relatively	small	and	unimportant	part	of	the	most	famous	and	controversial	theories	
of	law	are	concerned	with	the	propriety	of	using	the	expressions	‘primitive	law’	or	
‘international	law’	to	describe	the	cases	to	which	they	are	conventionally	applied.”74		
Read	in	context,	Hart	clearly	intends	to	dismiss	as	unimportant	the	question	of	
whether	rival	theories	of	law	sanction	talk	of	international	law	as	law,	for	as	he	
repeats	several	times	in	The	Concept	of	Law,	Hart	is	not	concerned	with	definitions.		
More	importantly,	Hart’s	discussion	of	international	law	makes	a	vital	contribution	
to	the	jurisprudential	task	he	undertakes	in	The	Concept	of	Law,	namely	making	
some	headway	in	explaining	how	law	contributes	to	the	production	of	social	order.		
Specifically,	in	Chapter	X	Hart	offers	arguments	intended	to	reinforce	three	
conclusions	he	has	defended	earlier	in	the	book.		First,	the	command	theory’s	
depiction	of	law	distorts	our	understanding	of	it,	and	so	ought	to	be	rejected.75		
Second,	law	differs	in	important	ways	from	morality,	and	so	we	ought	to	carefully	
distinguish	between	the	question	“what	is	law?”	and	any	number	of	moral	questions	
we	might	ask	about	it.		While	the	answers	to	some	of	those	questions	might	reveal	
certain	necessary	connections	between	law	and	morality,	this	is	not	the	case	with	
respect	to	the	very	existence	of	law.76		Third	and	finally,	a	division	of	labor	in	
making,	applying,	enforcing,	and	identifying	law,	and	so	in	sustaining	the	existence	
																																																								
74	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	4.	
75	Id.,	at	216-26.	
76	Id.,	at	227-32.	
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of	a	given	legal	order,	likely	enhances	law’s	ability	to	contribute	to	the	production	of	
social	order,	but	it	is	not	a	necessary	condition	for	the	existence	of	a	law-governed	
social	order.77		No	doubt	it	would	have	been	nice	had	Hart	told	us	more,	say	about	
exactly	how	differences	in	the	type	of	agents	and	circumstances	subject	to	
regulation	by	social	norms	affect	the	content	of	the	rules	and	the	kind	of	institutions	
that	regulate	(and	partly	constitute)	particular	societies.		But	insofar	as	Hart	wrote	
The	Concept	of	Law	as	an	introduction	to	legal	philosophy,	carried	out	largely	with	
the	intention	of	clearing	away	mistaken	legal	theories	that	he	thought	impeded	
either	theoretical	inquiry	or	moral	deliberation,	he	can	hardly	be	faulted	for	his	
failure	to	do	so.				
	 The	second	baseless	criticism	Waldron	levels	against	Hart	is	that	the	latter’s	
discussion	of	international	law	is	a	cause	of	the	fact	that	contemporary	legal	
philosophers	have	contributed	little	to	the	debate	over	the	nature	and	importance	of	
international	law	sparked	by	actions	undertaken	by	various	officials	in	the	George	
W.	Bush	administration,	as	well	as	academic	works	such	as	Goldsmith	and	Posner’s	
Limits	of	International	Law.78		Even	if	we	accept	arguendo	that	philosophers	failed	to	
engage	with	this	debate-cum-political	campaign,	it	is	hard	to	see	why	we	should	
attribute	that	fact	to	Hart’s	take	on	international	law.		After	all,	to	the	extent	
Goldsmith,	Posner,	Yoo	and	others	understand	(international)	law	along	the	lines	of	
the	command	theory,	Hart	explicitly	addresses	and	criticizes	their	position.		And	to	
																																																								
77	Id.,	at	232-37.	
78	Waldron,	supra	note	4,	at	210-11;	Waldron,	supra	note	4,	at	68-9.		JACK	L.	GOLDSMITH	AND	ERIC	
A.	POSNER,	THE	LIMITS	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	(2006).	
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the	extent	that	these	theorists	challenge	not	international	law’s	status	as	genuine	
law	but	the	conditions	under	which	it	actually	provides	those	it	addresses	with	
reasons	to	comply	with	it,	Hart	does	not	much	engage	with	that	question.79		Hart’s	
decision	not	to	take	up	in	any	detail	in	The	Concept	of	Law	the	topics	of	political	
obligation	and	law’s	legitimate	authority	has	not	impeded	contemporary	legal	and	
political	philosophers’	engagement	with	them.		Nor	is	it	clear	that	reflection	on	
international	law’s	de	jure	legitimacy	has	or	will	generate	new	accounts	of	what	
makes	law	legitimate.80	
	 Brian	Tamanaha	has	seized	on	Waldron’s	critique	of	Hart’s	depiction	of	
international	law	to	reiterate	two	long-standing	objections	to	Hart’s	analysis	of	law	
advanced	by	socio-legal	jurisprudents.81		The	first	is	Hart’s	characterization	in	
Chapter	VI	of	a	simple	(i.e.	primitive)	social	order	as	a	“pre-legal”	form	of	social	
																																																								
79	One	might	follow	Thomas	Franck	and	read	portions	of	The	Concept	of	Law,	including	Hart’s	
discussion	of	the	rule	of	recognition,	as	concerned	with	law’s	legitimacy.		See	Thomas	M.	Franck,	
Legitimacy	in	the	International	System,	82	AMERICAN	JOURNAL	OF	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	705	
(1988),	at	751-58.		Though	misguided	in	certain	respects,	this	reading	can	be	made	to	stand	up	to	
some	extent	as	long	as	our	concern	is	with	de	facto	legitimacy.		Yet	though	they	sometimes	claim	to	
be	engaged	only	in	the	kind	of	social	scientific	analysis	in	which	this	sense	of	legitimacy	has	its	place,	
few	doubt	that	Goldsmith,	Posner,	and	Yoo	actually	advance	a	normative	argument,	a	claim	regarding	
when	actors,	or	at	least	the	United	States,	ought	to	treat	international	legal	obligations	as	providing	it	
with	a	reason	for	action.	
80	See	David	Lefkowitz,	The	Legitimacy	of	International	Law,	in	GLOBAL	POLITICAL	THEORY	TODAY	
(David	Held	and	Pietro	Maffettone	eds.,	2016),	98-116.	
81	Tamanaha,	supra	note	2,	at	54.		See	also	Payandeh,	supra	note	5,	at	993.	
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structure.		By	implication,	and	ignoring	any	talk	of	resemblance	as	opposed	to	
identity,	socio-legal	jurisprudents	have	concluded	that	Hart	must	also	characterize	
international	law	as	pre-legal.		The	second	and	related	objection	is	that	in	
developing	his	analysis	of	the	concept	of	law	Hart	accords	an	unwarranted	priority	
to	the	municipal	law	of	a	well-functioning	modern	state,	or	worse	yet	restricts	the	
concept	of	law	to	such	a	legal	system,	a	conclusion	suggested	by	the	fact	that	as	a	
matter	of	consistency	Hart	must	depict	international	law	as	a	“pre-legal”	social	
order.	82		As	should	now	be	clear,	the	first	of	these	two	objections	is	misguided,	and	
to	the	extent	the	second	objection	rests	on	the	first,	it	too	should	be	rejected.		
Properly	understood,	Hart’s	characterization	in	Ch.	VI	of	a	simple	social	order	as	
“pre-legal”	means	only	that	such	a	society	lacks	a	division	of	labor	in	the	
performance	of	governance	tasks,	while	his	argument	in	the	last	section	of	chapter	X	
aims	to	establish	the	propriety	of	categorizing	international	law	as	law	properly	so-
called	despite	its	being	“pre-legal”	in	this	sense.	83		Given	his	poor	choice	of	words	
																																																								
82	Cotterell,	supra	note	2,	at	507,	writes:	“Hart	is	explicit:	the	introduction	of	secondary	rules	marks	
the	transition	from	a	pre-legal	to	a	legal	regime.		A	regime	of	social	rules	needs	this	union	if	it	is	to	be	
clearly	recognizable	as	law.		Although	Von	Daniels	thinks	that	international	law	(which,	in	Hart’s	
view,	is	basically	just	a	set	of	primary	rules)	is	law	for	Hart,	in	fact	Hart	carefully	avoids	any	such	
claim	and	treats	ordinary	usage	of	the	term	“international	law”	as	based	only	on	an	“analogy”	with	
law	understood	in	the	conceptually	adequate	sense.”	[citations	removed	from	quote.]	
83	Contra	Cotterrell,	then,	von	Daniels	is	right	to	describe	Hart	as	holding	that	“a	simple	regime	of	
primary	law	can	be	identified	as	a	legal	one.”		See	DETLEF	VON	DANIELS,	THE	CONCEPT	OF	LAW	
FROM	A	TRANSNATIONAL	PERSPECTIVE	(2010),	at	143.		
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Hart	undoubtedly	bears	considerable	responsibility	for	these	mistaken	objections.		
Nevertheless,	they	ought	to	be	discarded	in	light	of	the	argument	presented	here.	
What	about	Payandeh’s	assertion,	noted	in	the	previous	section,	that	for	
purposes	of	assessing	the	(relative)	simplicity	or	complexity	of	the	international	
legal	order	it	is	“more	convincing”	to	focus	on	how	it	functions	to	address	challenges	
of	uncertainty,	rigidity,	and	inefficiency	than	to	ask	“whether	international	law	
encompasses	legislative,	judicative,	and	executive	structures	comparable	to	the	
municipal	system	in	form.”84		Unfortunately,	Payandeh	never	explicitly	states	the	
standard	by	which	we	can	judge	the	depiction	of	international	law	as	primitive	to	be	
more	or	less	convincing.		However,	his	exploration	of	the	rules	and	mechanisms	
international	law	contains	for	addressing	uncertainty,	rigidity,	and	inefficiency	
suggests	that	it	is	shedding	light	on	international	law’s	ability	to	contribute	to	the	
production	of	social	order	that	provides	the	standard	Payandeh	implicitly	invokes.		
If	so,	then	Payandeh’s	description	of	these	rules	and	mechanisms	largely	supports	
Hart’s	characterization	of	international	law	as	akin	to	a	primitive	social	order,	once	
that	claim	is	properly	understood.		This	is	so	because	Payandeh	documents	the	
relative	paucity	of	specialization	in	the	performance	of	governance	tasks	that	
comprise	international	law,	and	points	to	various	important	respects	in	which	this	
distinguishes	the	effects	international	law	can	have	on	social	order	from	those	
produced	by	the	municipal	law	of	a	well-functioning	state.85		It	is	rather	ironic,	then,	
																																																								
84	Payandeh,	supra	note	5,	at	981.	
85	See,	e.g.,	Id.	at	994.	
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that	Payandeh	repeatedly	chastises	Hart	for	implying	that	international	law	is	
inferior	to	municipal	law	when	the	only	respect	in	which	Hart	asserts	this	is	the	case	
is	precisely	the	one	Payandeh	also	identifies.			
Payandeh	worries	that	Hart’s	characterization	of	international	law	as	“a	less	
developed	and	thereby	inferior	set	of	social	rules”	contributes,	or	at	least	could	
contribute,	to	a	diminution	of	its	legitimacy.86		For	example,	it	might	“lead	political	
decision-makers	–	even	if	only	subconsciously	–	to	be	more	inclined	to	disregard	the	
rules	of	international	law	when	non-compliance	is	in	their	interest,”	while	domestic	
judges	may	ask	“why	should	inferior	international	law	trump	conflicting	norms	of	
domestic	law?”87		Yet	here	again	Hart	is	international	law’s	friend,	not	foe.		The	
importance	of	a	particular	system	of	social	rules	lies	not	just	in	how	well	it	serves	to	
produce	social	order	but	also	in	the	matters	it	regulates.		No	necessary	inference	is	
warranted,	therefore,	from	the	relative	paucity	of	specialization	and	hierarchical	
structure	that	characterizes	international	law	to	any	conclusion	regarding	the	role	it	
ought	to	play	in	agents’	deliberations.		This	is	the	vitally	important	point	with	which	
Hart	concludes	his	discussion	of	international	law	in	chapter	X.		Having	argued	that	
with	respect	to	its	“formal	structure”	international	law	is	indeed	inferior	to	
municipal	law,	Hart	points	out	that	with	respect	to	its	content	“no	other	social	rules	
are	so	close	to	municipal	law	as	those	of	international	law.”88		Like	Bentham,	Hart	
																																																								
86	Id.,	at	978.	
87	Id.	
88	Hart,	supra	note	1,	at	237.	
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concludes	that	this	fact	warrants	the	treatment	of	both	as	examples	of	law	properly	
so-called.89						
	 By	his	own	account	Hart	sought	in	chapter	X	of	The	Concept	of	Law	to	defend	
only	the	modest	claim	that	classifying	international	law	with	municipal	law	as	law	
properly	so-called	was	unlikely	to	“obstruct	any	practical	or	theoretical	aim.”90		I	
suggest	a	bolder	claim	is	warranted:	foregrounding	the	resemblance	international	
law	bears	to	a	simple	social	order	provides	both	theoretical	and	practical/moral	
benefits.		The	former	consists	in	an	improved	understanding	of	how	international	
law	produces	social	order,	including	the	limits	of	its	ability	to	do	so.		The	sustained	
cross-disciplinary	engagement	over	the	past	few	decades	between	international	
relations	scholars	and	international	legal	theorists	on	the	question	of	international	
law’s	effectiveness	illustrates	this	point,	as	both	rationalism	and	constructivism	
have	been	put	to	good	use	to	illustrate	some	of	the	myriad	ways	in	which	
international	law	regulates	(or	fails	to	regulate)	the	conduct	of	members	of	a	largely	
																																																								
89	Suppose,	as	some	maintain,	that	Hart	thought	that	non-contingently	serving	to	advance	the	
minimum	content	of	natural	law	is	a	necessary	condition	for	a	set	or	system	of	rules	to	count	as	law.		
If	so,	then	one	might	read	into	Hart’s	talk	of	international	law	having	a	content	closer	to	that	of	
municipal	law	than	any	other	social	rules	his	implicit	recognition	of	the	fact	that	just	as	a	well-
functioning	municipal	legal	order	serves	to	restrain	violence,	theft,	and	fraud	between	individuals,	so	
too	a	well-functioning	international	legal	order	serves	to	restrain	the	use	of	violence,	theft,	and	fraud	
between	states	(though	not	between	states	and	colonies).	
90	Id.,	at	214.	
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horizontal	social	order.91		Though	there	is	a	place	even	in	this	explanatory	endeavor	
for	the	deployment	of	conceptual	apparatus	and	skills	in	which	philosophers	enjoy	a	
comparative	advantage,	they	are	likely	to	play	a	more	prominent	role	when	the	
conversation	shifts	from	a	concern	with	explanation	and	prediction	to	a	concern	
with	justification.		For	philosophers,	then,	the	biggest	payoff	from	an	engagement	
with	Hart’s	reflections	on	international	law	may	be	the	reminder	from	“one	of	their	
own”	that	law’s	utility	as	a	tool	for	realizing	some	desired	state	affairs	varies	quite	
considerably	depending	on	whether	it	is	the	law	of	a	well-functioning	state	or	
international	law.		Two	important	points	follow.		First,	when	they	turn	to	questions	
of	implementation,	theorists	of	global	justice	should	look	to	a	broad	range	of	
institutional	mechanisms	to	advance	the	goals	or	standards	they	defend,	and	
recognize	that	law,	international	or	domestic,	may	sometimes	provide	a	very	weak	
tool	for	affecting	the	change	they	desire.		Second,	attempts	to	deploy	international	
legal	norms	for	argumentative	purposes,	as	well	as	calls	for	reform	of	international	
law,	ought	to	rest	on	a	proper	understanding	of	how	it	contributes	to	the	production	
of	social	order,	namely	one	that	takes	as	its	starting	point	the	absence	(by	and	large)	
of	a	legislature,	compulsory	courts,	and	centralized	enforcement.		Arguably,	this	is	
so	not	only	practically-speaking	but	also	morally	as	well.92	
																																																								
91	See,	e.g.,	JEFFREY	L.	DUNOFF	&	MARK	A.	POLLACK,	INTERDISCIPLINARY	PERSPECTIVES	ON	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	AND	INTERNATIONAL	RELATIONS:	THE	STATE	OF	THE	ART,	(2013).	
92	For	arguments	to	this	effect,	see	David	Lefkowitz,	International	Law,	Institutional	Moral	Reasoning,	
and	Secession,	LAW	AND	PHILOSOPHY	(forthcoming);	ALLEN	BUCHANAN,	JUSTICE,	LEGITIMACY,	
AND	SELF-DETERMINATION	(2007);	STEVEN	R.	RATNER,	THE	THIN	JUSTICE	OF	INTERNATIONAL	
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*	 *	 *	
	 The	concept	of	a	social	rule	is	undoubtedly	the	centerpiece	of	Hart’s	analysis	
of	law,	and	his	characterization	of	law	in	terms	of	different	kinds	of	rules	marks	a	
critical	advance	over	Austin’s	reductive	account.		Perhaps	it	should	not	be	
surprising,	then,	that	Hart	relied	so	heavily	on	the	language	of	rules	when	
distinguishing	primitive	from	advanced	societies	in	The	Concept	of	Law.		As	I	have	
demonstrated,	however,	talk	of	rules	often	obscures	another	phenomenon	that	
appears	to	have	been	of	equal	if	not	greater	concern	to	Hart	when	he	invoked	that	
distinction,	namely	a	division	of	labor	in	making,	applying,	enforcing	and	identifying	
law,	and	so	in	sustaining	the	social	practice	that	constitutes	a	particular	legal	
system.		Understood	in	those	terms,	Hart’s	characterization	of	international	law	as	
resembling	a	simple	or	primitive	legal	order	was	true	when	he	wrote	it,	and	to	a	
lesser	but	still	considerable	degree,	it	remains	true	today.	
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